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ABSTRACT 
 
In the context of the contemporary emergence of a “postmodern Kierkegaard,” I take issue with 
the idea that Kierkegaardian thought involves an anti-essentialist rejection of ontology. I argue 
that Kierkegaard’s keynote existential analysis is paralleled by, if not tacitly set within, a less 
developed yet explicit ontology of human being. This “subjective ontology” is at once an ontology 
of the existing subject, and a subjectization of ontology. Thus, the essay has two aims. First, I 
seek to revive and further debate surrounding the structure of the Kierkegaardian self, by tracing 
something of its dynamic three-fold relational structure and various metaphysical polarities. 
Accordingly, spirit, anxiety and despair are understood in their ontological dimensions, and not 
just as existential possibilities. Second, I propose a way of bringing together Kierkegaardian 
existentiality (the three stages) with the ontology (the three relations). Despite important 
asymmetries between these two structures, the unity of Kierkegaard’s approach can only be 
appreciated through viewing them synoptically.   
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Explicating the contours of the individual’s task of existence is clearly the central positive 
intention of Kierkegaard’s voluminous writings. For him, the existential task involves the 
individual in an intensification of consciousness and freedom; an itinerary which leads 
from the shallowness of the aesthetic sphere of existence to the intensity of faith in the 
transcendent God of Christianity. But precisely what is this being for whom such a task is 
set? What can be said about Kierkegaard’s conception of human being as such, and 
how can this be understood as relating to, and indeed illuminating, the task as he 
presents it? What, indeed, is the connection between the dimensions of existence of the 
individual (in its three stages), and the ontological structure of the self (in its three 
relations)? 
There has been surprisingly little recent scholarship on the ontology of human being in 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, and even less on the relationship between this 
understanding and his keynote contentions regarding the existential task.1 Of more 
concern than this silence, however, is the claim that Kierkegaard rejected ontology 
altogether; that in his opposition to philosophical rationalism (and especially rationalistic 
idealism) and his consequent emphasis on the existing subject, he spurned the whole 
notion of the essential structure of this subject.  
Over the last decade or more, Kierkegaard has attracted a great deal of new interest 
precisely on the basis of his perceived anti-essentialism, as this has been variously 
understood. Thus, recent years has seen the emergence of a broadly “postmodern 
Kierkegaard,” a development highlighted by Derrida’s reading of Fear and Trembling2 
and one given extended treatment by scholars such as John D. Caputo and Mark C. 
Taylor who have persuasively argued, in different ways, for a quasi-deconstructionist 
Kierkegaard.3 According to Caputo, for instance, in their opposition to the ultra-
essentialism of the western tradition (summed up in “the infinite appetite of Hegel’s 
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totalizing dialectic”), Kierkegaard and Derrida “have a common nemesis … and a 
common affection for everything singular and fragment-like.”4  
Of course, such readings of the Kierkegaardian project – rooted as they are in some 
important aspects of his thought – are far from new; but there are clear dangers with 
absolutizing such interpretations. More than half a century ago, for example, Gilson 
baldly proclaimed: “In the case of Wolff and Hegel, we had ontologies without existence, 
but in Kierkegaard’s own speculation we seem to be left with an existence without 
ontology.”5 In Gilson’s view, Kierkegaardian existentialism was an over-reaction to the 
domination of essentialism – a declaration of divorce between existence and philosophy 
qua essentialism – whereas what was (and is) needed was a reorientation within 
philosophy in which existence and essence each receive their rightful place.    
In what follows, I will take issue with this (variously articulated) conception of 
Kierkegaard as an opponent of all essentialist reflection. I argue, contra Gilson, that 
Kierkegaardian thought is not a matter of “existence without ontology”; and contra 
Caputo, that his campaign is not reducible simply to the championing of singularity and 
the banishment of universalist claims. On the contrary, I will argue that from the 
perspective of the authorship as a whole, Kierkegaard may in fact be seen as making an 
extraordinary response to the very task indicated by Gilson. Kierkegaard’s reorientation 
of philosophy does indeed proceed by “de-essentializing” it, but in so doing he does not 
banish essentialist onto-metaphysical categories as much as redeploys them so that 
they are placed in the service of existential thinking. The result, I claim, is that 
Kierkegaardian thought provides not simply an existential view of human being, but an 
ontology of the existing individual, and that these two aspects are eventually 
inseparable.    
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Accordingly, the essay falls into two main phases. First, I make some inevitably cursory 
comments concerning the complex structure of Kierkegaard’s largely implicit ontology of 
human being, by drawing on a line of continuity embedded in two of his most important 
later pseudonymous works, The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death, as 
well as the early and posthumously published manuscript, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est. 
The key here is to note the way in which these works trace the dynamics of “spirit” and 
“self” within a schema of the three dialectical relations (and five metaphysical polarities) 
that is the essence of the individual. Second, I will suggest that it is only through 
considering this “three relations” conception (ontology; essence) together with the 
familiar “three stages” framework (existence), that the unity of Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the individual can be fully presented: as an approach which implicitly 
situates its existential contentions within a discernible, if less developed, ontological 
conception.  
 
I. THE IDEA OF A KIERKEGAARDIAN ONTOLOGY 
In arguing that Kierkegaardian thought does not amount to an anti-essentialism per se, it 
is first important to be clear about what is meant by a Kierkegaardian ontology. 
Kierkegaard’s approach might well be described (with Heideggerian echoes) as 
something of a “regional ontology.” That is, the question of Being as such, or the being 
of things in general, is far from his concern, and he is of course fundamentally opposed 
to any hubristic attempt to enclose theology within an over-arching ontological 
conception. Yet despite his extreme suspicion about the systematizing nature of 
ontological speculation, Kierkegaardian thought is shot through with what I will call an 
implicit “subjective ontology”: an ontology of the existing subject in which ontology is 
subjectivized. Obviously – as Kierkegaard goes to enormous lengths to show throughout 
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his Postscript – an existential system cannot be given,6 but there is a great deal of 
difference between “system” in a totalizing Hegelian (or any other) sense and a broad 
conception of an underlying commonality as a background against which human 
existentiality may be understood. What Kierkegaard’s subjective ontology does provide, 
is a clear set of essential metaphysical parameters within which the contentions of his 
mature pseudonymous works can operate. 
The ironic ambiguity of the term, “subjective ontology”, is deliberate. The suggestion is 
that in developing his view of the self, Kierkegaard is saying something not simply about 
the individual but also about the nature and limits of metaphysics. The “subjective 
ontology” is first of all an ontology of the individual subject, albeit a subject very 
differently conceived from the substantialist definitions of subjectivity to which 
Kierkegaard takes exception. It refers to his largely implicit conception of the basic 
ontological structure of the human person: the – albeit minimalist and dynamic – 
“essence” or common factors involved in all human being; the definitively human way of 
being. Notwithstanding his clear wish to center attention on the existing individual, 
Kierkegaard has a very definite set of characteristics in mind that for him make a human 
being – any human being – the kind of being it is.7  
But, second, the “subjective ontology” is also a subjectization of the traditional 
metaphysical categories he uses in his work. Kierkegaard’s is not a speculative ontology 
or a theory of being in general: it is an ontological perspective orientated purely toward 
illuminating the individual’s task of existence, an ontology that has validity only when it is 
“read off from man’s concrete lived experience.”8  Kierkegaard’s ontology is “subjective” 
insofar as it refuses to validate traditional objective, speculative, de-personalized, de-
particularized ontology. Even in utilizing a traditional (and indeed, an idealistic) 
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metaphysical vocabulary, he refuses to deploy it so as to make any claims “from 
nowhere” about the nature of being per se. 
It is, I would argue, important not to mistake Kierkegaard’s deliberately indirect style and 
his rejection of theoretical system-building for a simple anti-essentialist focus on 
singularity to the exclusion of all else. Nor, indeed, should his approach in any way be 
seen in terms of a commitment to philosophical obscurity. On the contrary, far from his 
thought having anything to do with a post-essentialist refusal to recognize the validity of 
universalist categories, the central concepts which comprise his ontology are precisely 
universals, and classical ontological oppositions at that. The key point, however, is that 
Kierkegaard’s universals do not statically define the meaning of the individual’s 
existence, but rather are general categories for organizing the individual’s reflection 
upon its existence in all its idiosyncratic richness; they provide a horizon within which 
this reflection may take place, without detailing what must lie within that horizon.  
Finally, just as important as noting Kierkegaard’s idiosyncratic style and poetic tone, is 
the recognition of important structures in his work which for strategic reasons (i.e., the 
priority of his attack on totalizing ontologies in which the individual qua individual 
disappears) do not emerge as clearly as other more programmatic structures. Yet 
Kierkegaard’s absolute insistence on the one God who graces humankind with the one 
means of universal salvation by bringing the eternal into the temporal, and who calls the 
individual toward its “ideal self,” all presuppose an underlying commonality in human 
being. But it is a commonality which is given content, concretion and meaning only 
through the individual’s struggling with its task of existence.  
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II. EXPLORING THE ONTOLOGY 
The suggestion is not that in The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness unto Death 
Kierkegaard introduces anything particularly marginal to his purposes as set out 
elsewhere in the authorship, nor indeed that these works represent any qualitative 
change in his thinking. On the contrary, it would appear that in discussing the dynamic 
ontological constitution of the individual self, the pseudonymous authors of the 
psychological works are simply making explicit the metaphysics of existence as it is 
discussed throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus. After all, one constant throughout 
these texts is the way in which the authors build their edifices of thought around such 
keynote concepts as actuality/ possibility, finitude/ infinitude, temporality/ eternity, 
subjectivity/ objectivity, real/ ideal, and so on.  
The often quoted opening passage of The Sickness unto Death has been the subject of 
so much interest because – notwithstanding the mind-boggling density of its quasi-
Hegelian prose – it is one of the very few instances in the Kierkegaardian authorship 
where a more or less explicit and cohesive interpretation of the structure of human being 
is presented. Consequently, this is a passage of enormous importance for understanding 
not only the unity of the Anti-Climacian text it introduces, but also Kierkegaard’s 
ontological vision as a whole, as it is developed – often in seemingly very different ways 
– primarily in works by Vigilius Haufniensis and Johannes Climacus.  
In focussing on the web of claims made in this passage in the context of how they are 
played out throughout the texts in question, it is first important to focus on the key terms 
“spirit”, “self” and “synthesis”, paying particular attention to the essentialist claims made 
through their deployment, especially via Kierkegaard’s characteristic use of the cupola. 
Second, the relational – and thus dynamic “synthetic” – aspects of the ontology will be 
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investigated, noting the contentions made about the essential/ontological structure of the 
individual’s ascent toward the eternal.   
 
(a) Spirit, Self, Synthesis 
Anti-Climacus’ use of the term, “spirit” (Aand), is particularly problematic in terms of its 
varied set of associations and broad semantic field involving both a broad Christian and 
German Idealist background. For both Kierkegaard and Hegel, for example, a life lived to 
greater degree in accord with spirit is a life of mature flourishing, guided by far-sighted 
perspective. Yet for Hegel, the life of spirit concerns the way of philosophical science; for 
Kierkegaard, it concerns subjective commitment. For Hegel, spirit is at once human and 
divine; for Kierkegaard spirit is an eminently human category, even if it does actively 
open the individual toward the demands of the eternal. For the Kierkegaardian 
pseudonymous authors in question, spirit appears to function as an innate human 
“faculty” that operates by unsettling the individual through awakening it to its eternal 
telos. In itself, it is neither a source of good nor evil; in being the foundation of 
consciousness it is rather the condition of the possibility of both.9 Spirit is the gnawing 
voice within that breathes fire and intensity into human existence, driving it along the 
difficult road toward fulfillment of its potentiality. Thus, spirit is of the essence of human 
being: “the human being is spirit”, Anti-Climacus declares, for as Haufniensis puts it, it is 
precisely spirit that distinguishes the human from the animal.10 
The notion of the “self” (Selv) is a similarly crucial, but again his usage of the term poses 
difficulties. This is particularly occasioned by the Anti-Climacian tendency to use it both 
for the entire system of relations that comprises the individual (the ontology of the self), 
as well as in the narrower and more programmatic sense to refer to the outcome of the 
process of spiritualization through which the individual “becomes” a self (the existential 
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task of becoming a self).11 When used in the former sense, the self-system corresponds 
to the subjective ontology as a whole. When used in the latter sense, an ontological 
dimension is still evident in so far as the self is specifically linked to spirit, even to the 
point of functionally identifying the two: “spirit is the self.” That is, spirit and self are 
functional equivalents to the extent that spirit is roused in the self and is thereby the 
ground of the self, or alternatively, the self is the creation of spirit. In any case, both are 
essential to what it is to be a human being.      
 Finally, the key Anti-Climacian passage refers at various points to the self as “synthesis” 
(Synthese). This too carries with it significant ambiguities, for while the pseudonymous 
authors of the psychological works name several metaphysical polarities that comprise 
the self, each of which have their own synthetic imperatives, they also insist upon the 
oneness of the synthesis of the self.12 When the accounts of Haufniensis, Climacus and 
Anti-Climacus are taken together, what emerges is a picture of the individual as 
essentially comprised around a series of five metaphysical polarities which when viewed 
together form a single quinary synthesis. The essential unity of the various polarities is 
perhaps best illustrated by noting the operation of a limiting and an infinitizing function in 
all but one of the polarities. Thus, the single quinary synthesis might be said to have a 
“factical” and a “hyperbolic” pole in which the former (body, soul, finitude, necessity, 
reality, and temporality) sits in stark and apparently irreconcilable opposition to the latter 
(infinitude, possibility, ideality and eternity). This is no small claim: that the human being 
is, in essence, a series of prima-facie metaphysical dichotomies. And it is only through 
an analysis of the itinerant dynamics of the relations of selfhood – to which the essay 
now turns – that it becomes clear how Kierkegaard avoids the rather Sartrian conclusion 
that the individual is therefore simply a contradiction; a “useless passion” as it were.       
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In Anti-Climacus’ dialectical view of human ontology, the self-system and the 
journey towards selfhood are understood within the framework of three dialectical 
relations that I will refer to as the relations of “immediacy,” of “self-reflexivity” and of 
“eternity.”13 Fundamental to this conception is the idea of the teleological orientation 
towards the third of these, though at no point does this imply any sense of inexorable 
momentum toward this end. On the contrary, a central Kierkegaardian contention is that 
anxiety (Angest) operates as a powerful disincentive to the movement from immediacy 
to self-reflexivity and beyond, and that despair (Fortvivleslse) is therefore the usual state 
of being for the individual.  
The major foci of those sections of the pseudonymous authorship that develop the 
ontology, are: (a) the structures of each of the three relations of the ontology, and (b) the 
nature of the two “leaps” by which the individual moves from immediacy to faith. Spirit 
(which is posited or ”awakened” in self-reflexivity, and reaches its telos with the 
establishment of the eternal relation) functions as the impetus for the forward movement 
towards faith, while anxiety and despair (which grow proportionately with the increase in 
spirit) function in different ways as causes of stagnation. The movement from lower to 
higher levels of the ontology is understood in terms of a developing complexity in the 
synthetic relations: from the simple unity of immediacy, to the self-reflexivity of the 
second relation, to the “relation which relates in turn to that which has established the 
whole relation” (SD, 43) in the state-of-being of faith. This “itinerary” may be represented 
as follows:14  
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RELATION OF IMMEDIACY: 
(body-soul) 
SELF-REFLEXIVE RELATION: 
Self (body-soul) 
ETERNAL RELATION: 
God [Self (body-soul)] 
 
(b) The Relation of Immediacy: An Ontology of Dreaming Spirit 
The issue of the status of the relation of immediacy within the self-system is by no 
means a simple matter, particularly when juxtaposing the perspectives of Haufniensis 
and Anti-Climacus. It would seem, however, that both Kierkegaardian authors conceive 
of immediacy as the simple psycho-somatic unity prior to the active positing of spirit.  
While it is tempting to read this foundational relation in terms of a paradigmatic 
symmetry with the other polarities of selfhood (as has often be done) – thus, to 
designate body as the factical pole and soul as the hyperbolic pole – the way in which 
Haufniensis discusses the nature and function of soul would mitigate against such an 
interpretation. Unlike, for example, a Thomist conception of soul which is understood as 
both the animating (morphic) principle of the body as well as the spiritual dimension of 
human being (through which the individual has a subsistent mode of being not 
intrinsically dependent on body), soul seems to have only the former meaning in 
Kierkegaard’s psychological works. In this way, the body-soul polarity would appear to 
be a synthesis of two quite finite terms. Certainly Haufniensis’ discussion of the polarity 
places it logically prior to the active intervention of spirit which marks the movement into 
the second relation of selfhood, and with it self-conscious freedom through the positing 
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of the hyperbolic polarities. “In innocence,” he contends, “man is not qualified by spirit, 
but is psychically qualified, in immediate unity with his natural condition. The spirit in 
man is dreaming.”15 It is not, therefore, that the immediate individual is entirely devoid of 
spirit; it is rather that in such a person the spirit’s potentiality lies undeveloped. In a 
similar vein, Anti-Climacus comments that “[t]he immediate person (in so far as 
immediacy can persist entirely without reflection), is specifiable only as soul” (SD, 81).  
In the language of Anti-Climacus, immediacy is a “negative unity” insofar as the middle 
term of the relation – spirit – plays only a passive role in the synthesizing process (for 
spirit is, after all, according to Haufniensis, “dreaming.”) Notwithstanding its 
“unconscious” state, spirit’s role in the dialectic of immediacy is to act as a “pathway” (as 
Hannay helpfully puts it [SD, 168, fn. 5]) along which body and soul may relate; to be the 
passive principle of unity which facilitates a basic level of integrity of being prior to the 
emergence of self-reflexive consciousness.  
 
(c) The Self-Reflexive Relation: An Ontology of Waking Spirit 
To pursue Haufniensis’ metaphor, it might be said that the second relation in Anti-
Climacus’ schema is made possible by the “waking” of spirit, and thus the emergence of 
reflexive consciousness. It is at this point that the troubling dreams of immediacy caused 
by the slumbering giant of spirit, spill over into the emergence of consciousness and thus 
the positing of the reflexive polarities. But here a great irony emerges: that any 
development in consciousness (i.e., “spiritualization”) brings with it an increase in 
anxiety. And that this is precisely the reason for the pervasive attraction of immediacy 
that is explored throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus: the implicit desire to dwell in the 
false Eden of mediocrity. Here, as everywhere, the ontology is developed along purely 
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subjective lines, by opening a window into the key issues involved in the existential 
stages.     
A great deal of The Sickness unto Death is devoted to fleshing out the dynamics of the 
polarities that emerge in this second relation, particularly as seen by the failure to 
successfully synthesize them, a situation which is referred to as the imbalance 
(misforhold; literally, “mis-relation”) of despair. In terms of the ubiquity of despair, the nub 
of the problem is to be seen precisely in the shared nature of the reflexive polarities: 
namely, the human impossibility of synthesizing the factical poles (finitude, actuality, 
necessity) with the hyperbolic poles (infinitude, ideality, possibility). Thus, apart from the 
climax of the eternal relation, the human being is essentially a contradiction, hopelessly 
stretched between finitude and infinitude, unambiguously neither one thing nor the other.  
The medium of the infinitization of the self is the faculty of imagination, which thus 
occupies a central place in the Kierkegaardian ontology. Imagination is relatively inactive 
in the individual who is in despair of finitude, though equally the person who is 
intoxicated with the infinite – who is cast adrift from reality on the ocean of imagination – 
also suffers from this mis-relation of despair. In a brief series of passages, Anti-Climacus 
develops a theory of imagination – qua the direct function of waking spirit – that might 
profitably be compared with those of Fichte, Kant and Heidegger. He says of 
imagination: “It is not a faculty like the other faculties – if one wishes to speak in this way 
– it is the faculty instar omnium [for all faculties]. What feelings, understanding and will a 
person has depends in the last resort upon what imagination he has – how he 
represents himself to himself” (SD, 60-61). If, as I have maintained, “spirit” for 
Kierkegaard is to be understood as the originating faculty of human consciousness, then 
there would appear to be something of a three-tiered understanding of the human 
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faculties here, with (a) cognition, volition and emotion being made possible by (b) the 
activity of the imagination, which is itself a product of (c) the upsurge of spirit.     
In terms of the finite-infinite polarity of the self-reflective relation, “concretion” is the 
synthetic goal. Yet this notion of synthesis must give us pause, for in Anti-Climacus’ 
formulation the synthesis of this polarity is an “achievement”16 of hyperbolic proportions. 
Concretion of the self, Anti-Climacus says, consists in “infinitely coming away from 
oneself in an infinitizing of the self, and in infinitely coming back to the self in the 
finitization” (SD, 60). Here is an image of a life lived to the utmost intensity, the individual 
swinging prodigiously from one pole of its essence to the other, and repeating this 
movement – as the standard assumption must be – in each moment. And nor can such 
a position be written off as merely an extreme voice within the Kierkegaardian panoply of 
pseudonyms. It is, after all, Johannes Climacus’ conviction in Postscript that “[i]t is only 
momentarily that the particular individual is able to realize existentially a unity of the 
infinite and the finite which transcends existence” (CUP, 176). The radical nature of 
Kierkegaard’s metaphysics of the existing individual comes to the fore at this point: in a 
prima facie sense, becoming a self would appear to be beyond the possibility of 
actualization. And this seems to be exactly Anti-Climacus’ point: ultimately such a task is 
impossible, but for the positing of the eternal through which the self is able to undergo a 
kind of infinitization that is no longer despairing, but both rigorous and sustainable.    
This is a crucial point. At first glance, Anti-Climacus’ discussion of ontological balance in 
the self-reflexive polarities (i.e., “despair considered without regard to consciousness”) 
does lend itself to being read as a psychology of intra-personal balance through which the 
spirited individual is able to do justice to the full dimensions of its being. Such a tame and 
entirely “reasonable” reading of Anti-Climacus’ ultra-Christian persona allows for an easy 
secularization (and “pop-psychologization”) of Kierkegaard’s thought. But on closer 
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inspection it is clear that Anti-Climacus is offering no such thing: there is nothing remotely 
“sensible” or “reasonable” about Anti-Climacus’, contentions; and this is, after all, the point. 
The whole section on the despair of finitude-infinitude begins with the programmatic claim 
that the emergence of selfhood through the “conscious synthesis of finitude and infinitude 
…can only be done in relationship to God.” 17 Thus, right at the very beginning of the 
section is highlighted the inevitability of the failure of any attempt to achieve selfhood, and 
with it the synthesis of the self-reflexive polarities, in terms of self-reflexivity alone. The 
eternal-relation, far from being a possible “added extra” once the individual has become 
ontologically balanced in its own right, is essential for the synthesis to occur in the first 
place. Anti-Climacus’ conclusion is extreme: self-consciousness without God-
consciousness is despair, and ultimately the epitome of absurdity.  
The second polarity of the self-reflexive relation – necessity-possibility – appears to 
function as an overt application of the finite/infinite polarity to the dynamics of existence. 
Thus, the individual is open to both the infinite scope of possible actions, thoughts, 
emotions, commitments etc, as well as the finite nature of the options that factically lie 
open before it, and despair arises through the inevitable mis-relation of these two. Again, 
the essential metaphysical basis underlying possible modes of existence is thereby 
made clear: all individual becoming occurs through the intersection of necessity and 
possibility.  
Necessity – understood, of course, existentially – is the limited context for one’s 
possibility; but it might also, and with equal legitimacy, be put the other way around: 
possibility is the openness arising out of one’s context of necessity. The Kierkegaardian 
authors tend to merge the concepts of “necessity” [Nødvendighed] and “actuality” 
[Virkelighed]: both refer to the limiting context in which one finds oneself in the moment 
of decision by which one is able to become oneself in freedom. Thus:  
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, the self is just as much possible as necessary; although it is 
indeed itself [actuality], it has to become itself [existence]. To the extent that it is 
itself [actuality], it is necessary; and to the extent that it must become itself 
[potentiality], it is a possibility.18 
Having said that, there remains an implicit “in principle” distinction between the two 
conceptions. What is (actuality) for Kierkegaard, is the result of the past syntheses of 
possibility and necessity; but in the moment of decision, the two categories blend so that 
actuality becomes the limiting context for one’s horizon of possibilities. That is, necessity 
is actuality insofar as it is instantiated in the moment.  
While the self’s becoming is indeed a function of the continual openness to future 
possibilities, this is not to identify necessity and actuality on one hand, and becoming 
and possibility on the other. Becoming is always a function of possibility and necessity in 
synthesis, for without necessity there can be no “where“ according to which possibility 
may take its meaning and its context; from which it may “launch” itself. After all, actuality 
is itself the product of past syntheses of necessity with possibility, and to this extent 
possibility as it presents itself in the moment of actuality is parasitic, on 
actuality/necessity. This is important because the authorship as a whole frequently 
attaches negative connotations to the category of necessity (as also with finitude), but – 
notwithstanding significant caveats – extols possibility as positively salvific. This at times 
uncritical preference for the hyperbolic over the factical is characteristic of Kierkegaard, 
and this remains one of the more problematic features of the subjective ontology.19 
As the middle term in the polarity,20 freedom is of defining essential significance for 
human being: “the self is freedom.” It is the dialectical structure of the necessity-
possibility polarity in the ontology that ensures that the Kierkegaardian notion of freedom 
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stands in strident opposition to any notion of freedom as “liberum arbitrium,” for all 
freedom is by definition, situated.21 Furthermore, the Kierkegaardian ontology of freedom 
is thoroughly theological in its sweep, as would have to be any synthetic third term that 
requires the positing of the eternal relation for its realization. In Anti-Climacus’ words, the 
possibility of despair for an individual which is teleologically orientated towards its 
creator is explained when one understands that “God, who made man this relation, as it 
were lets go of it” (SD, 46). This “letting go” is a metaphor for the granting of freedom, 
but by virtue of its ontological foundation in God, human freedom does not amount to 
true autonomy. Here is a paradox in Kierkegaard’s notion of freedom that Louis Dupré 
has referred to as the “dialectic between autonomy and theonomy in the constitution of 
the self.”22 The individual is entirely “free” to reject God, but in so doing it is not acting 
truly in freedom, for it is ontologically – essentially – related to its creator.  
In the early Kierkegaardian work, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, a final reflexive polarity 
may be identified, albeit one coming out of a quite different conceptual context. It is out 
of the “collision”23 between the real (actual self) and the ideal (imagined self) that self-
consciousness is said to emerge, a quality which for Kierkegaard is both intimately 
connected with the waking of spirit, and which is also the first fruits of spirit. Of course, 
the motif of synthetic balance applies here also: the individual who is swamped by 
ideality (by fantastic and unrealizable flights of the imaginative ambition)24 is as much in 
despair as one who labors under the weight of the real, devoid of imaginative 
transcendence. 
The real and the ideal are brought into relationship through the mediatory oversight of 
consciousness. Existential reflection is thus a function of self-consciousness: the self-
conscious self accepts the challenge of existence as a task, and as such is prepared to 
struggle with the prima facie dichotomies that it is aware comprise it. In this way, self-
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consciousness stands between the actuality of the self and its ideal image of itself. If 
immediacy is “disinterested,” self-consciousness is – by virtue of its relational nature – 
intensely interested.25  
Through its various polarities, the self-reflexive relation is, according to Anti-Climacus, a 
“positive relation,” since the various synthesizing middle terms involved – the concrete 
self, freedom (and to which is added, self-consciousness) – are all “positive third terms”; 
that is, synthesizing terms which actively “supervise” (again, to use Hannay’s word [SD, 
168, fn. 5]) the dialectically opposed terms of each polarity. There is no sense in which 
these pivotal Kierkegaardian categories are to be understood simply as mediations 
between position and negation ala the Hegelian dialectics of Aufhebung. They are not 
simply sublimations and preservations of the opposed poles of each synthesis, but must 
rather be understood as qualitatively new realities that are, in fact, the ontological 
foundations of human existentiality.  
 
(d) The Eternal Relation: An Ontology of Faith as the Telos of Spirit 
To this point, the theme of synthetic balance has been central. However, in turning to the 
third and final relation in the Kierkegaardian ontology – the point at which the relation 
that relates to itself in turn relates to that which established the whole relation – the 
notions of balance and synthesis noticeably slip away. In relating to the source of its 
being, the person of faith sides specifically with one side of the temporal-eternal 
opposition. That is, as Dupré has pointed out,26 the dialectic of faith is precisely to side 
with the eternal (the faith perspective) over the temporal (the worldly perspective). For 
Kierkegaard, the telos of spirit is precisely the eternal.27  
Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms nowhere extrapolate upon the dialectics of this third relation 
that I refer to simply as the “eternal relation” (or alternatively, the “God-relation”), for in a 
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sense this in-breaking of the transcendent represents the impossibility of dialectical 
thinking. Nonetheless, it is clear that in this third relation the “horizontality” of the first and 
second relations give way to a transformative “verticality.” But what is more, under the 
influence of the eternal the reflexive hyperbolic poles (the infinite, the possible and the 
ideal) are all transformed into states that are both sustainable and stable (i.e., 
“eternalized”), as well as being filled with an intensity appropriate for the fulfillment of 
spirit. In terminology borrowed from The Concept of Irony,28 the “external infinity” of 
imagination (that takes the individual beyond and away from itself), is replaced by the 
“internal” or “true infinity” of the inwardness of faith. Similarly, the vast but empty spaces 
of temporal possibility are replaced by the faith that (as Anti-Climacus repeats almost 
mantra like in sections of The Sickness unto Death) “for God, everything is possible” 
(SD, 68ff). Finally, once the eternal relation has been posited, the notion of the ideal self 
becomes linked to the idea of the self’s “absolute telos.” 
It is only by recognizing such a shift in the meaning of some of Anti-Climacus’ key terms 
through the movement into the eternal relation, that rhapsodic passages such as the 
extraordinary final chapter of The Concept of Anxiety – in which infinity, possibility and 
eternity are used more or less synonymously – can be made comprehensible. Thus, just 
as the movement from immediacy to self-reflexivity marks a qualitative ontological 
change in the individual’s mode of being, so too does the second great leap into the 
relation of eternity. And whereas the movement from immediacy to self-reflexivity 
involved the positing of the hyperbolic aspects of human being, the establishment of the 
God-relation brings these aspects to fruition, absolutizing or “eternalizing” them.   
The theological focus of this final relation of selfhood thus confirms the theological 
trajectory of the entire ontology, as has already been glimpsed in terms of the 
impossibility of synthesis in the self-reflexive relation. For Anti-Climacus, the ontological 
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situation is astonishingly clear: “[a] person who has no God has no self either” (SD, 70). 
From the point of view of eternity, mere self-reflexivity appears as the frustration of spirit, 
the suffocation of the self. From Anti-Climacus’ perspective, it is only through 
“transparently resting” in one’s ground of being, that selfhood per se can be truly 
realized: for him, this is not a matter of religion, but of ontology!  
Closely associated with the strikingly theological nature of Kierkegaard’s subjective 
ontology, is its thoroughly teleological nature: “every human being,” he asserts, “is 
primitively organized as a self, characteristically determined to become himself” (SD, 
63). The individual “become[s] himself” not simply by striving to become any self – 
although it is true that at the lowest levels of spiritualization, the individual resists even 
that task – but by becoming the self which is in tune with its creator: its absolute telos. 
Far from sharing the anti-essentialist perspectives of post-modernity, Kierkegaard and 
his pseudonyms insist that there is a definite transcendent “standard” to which the 
existing individual is directed, and the failure to acknowledge and seek this in-built telos 
within the self is by definition a form of despair.  
In this way, the defiant individual, who is engaged in its own “causa-sui” project,29 is to 
the deepest extent in ontological mis-relation, for such a person “wants to tear his self 
away from the power that established it” (SD, 50), to refuse the final relation of the 
ontology of this self. Anti-Climacus’ assessment is stark: “[t]he self, which in his despair 
he wants to be, is a self he is not” (SD, 50). Thus, despair at its most intense is not 
simply defiant, but self-defeating: it is to make oneself a contradiction. This is probably 
as strong a claim for theism as it is possible to make, and it perhaps also provides an 
insight into the extreme ideality of Anti-Climacus’ outlook from which even Kierkegaard 
himself shrunk back.30   
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The deeply theo-teleological31 nature of the subjective ontology highlights the extent of 
the essentialism residing at the heart of the pseudonymous authorship’s philosophy of 
the existing individual. However, what starkly differentiates this essentialist focus from 
that of Hegel (or Aristotle for that matter) is Kierkegaard’s rejection of the logic of 
inexorability. For Kierkegaard, the individual becomes itself only through its conscious 
exercise of freedom, and even then only against the considerable momentum of anxiety. 
In a sense, this logic of non-inexorability stems directly from Kierkegaard’s insistence on 
divine transcendence (according to which God transcends the dialectic of selfhood 
according to the structure of the third relation) over Hegel’s theology of immanence (in 
which the divine is a function of Spirit).   
It is Haufniensis who provides the key concept for understanding the synthesis of the 
temporal and the eternal. For him, the eternal serves as the “foothold” in the flux of time; 
a foothold which structures and humanizes time, not flooding the temporal and thereby 
destroying it, but merely “touching” it in the moment (Øieblikket). If existentially, the 
eternal moment is the instant of decision, ontologically it is the point at which the 
temporal and the eternal – the human and the divine – ineffably come into relation. In 
this way, the temporal and the eternal are no longer terms requiring a positive third of 
their own, since for Kierkegaard, in terms of the subjective ontology, there can be 
nothing higher than the eternal. Instead – and in so far as it is still permissible to speak 
of dialectical synthesis in this context – I would suggest that “the eternal moment” should 
be understood as the synthesising term between the temporal (qua past) and the 
temporal (qua future).32  
From this perspective, the temporal and the eternal may be seen as “summative 
categories” in Kierkegaard’s subjective ontology, and it does so in a way which 
reinforces the divine-human dualism that runs throughout the authorship. Under the 
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category of temporality may be gathered the elements of the psycho-somatic unity (body 
and soul), finitude, necessity, reality (or the real self), and the externally imaginative (or 
“un-eternalized”) forms of infinitude, possibility and ideality. There may be gathered, on 
the other hand, all those elements of the ontology that relate teleologically to the eternal: 
spirit, freedom, self-consciousness, the concrete self , the absolute telos, and the 
internally imaginative (or “eternalized”) forms of infinitude and possibility. This dualistic 
structure of Kierkegaard’s subjective ontology serves as the onto-metaphysical 
foundation for the stages of existence. 
 
III. VIEWING THE STAGES AND THE RELATIONS TOGETHER 
Given this cursory consideration of the three relations of the ontology, the question 
remains as to the nature of their relationship with the three stages of existence which are 
so richly and explicitly developed in other areas of the authorship. Insofar as 
Kierkegaard planned his various works to form a multi-dimensional whole, it makes 
sense that there would be significant points of interactive parallel between these two 
literary-conceptual structures.  
My suggestion is as follows: that the three relations may be seen as providing an 
ontological account of what is deeply going on, and what is essentially at stake, in the 
three stages of existence. Kierkegaard’s subjective ontology embodies a dialectical 
liveliness through which it relates directly to the existential task by providing an 
ontological horizon within which the dimensions of existence may be understood. That is 
to say that the process by which the individual moves from one stage/sphere of 
existence to the next, bears direct comparison to the positing of the various 
metaphysical polarities that constitute (though not in any substantialistic sense) the 
relations of selfhood. Further, the ontology highlights the essential significance of the 
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experience of both anxiety and despair, which must thereby be understood as 
ontological categories in their own right.  
Having said that, it would be quite misleading to suggest that these two structures 
correspond in any neat linear fashion, for there are important asymmetries here that 
Kierkegaard (via his various pseudonyms) seems unconcerned to reconcile. First, there 
is no simple correlation between the aesthetic stage and the relation of immediacy. As 
the archetypal aesthete, “A” from Either/Or amply demonstrates, the individual at the 
aesthetic stage is constantly and reflectively fixated on the quest for the “interesting.” 
Indeed, not only is A’s search for the interesting infinitely restless, but as seen in his 
failure to make firm choices and commitments, he represents an almost perfect case of 
what Anti-Climacus refers to as the despair of infinity and/or possibility. Given that the 
finite/infinite and necessity/possibility polarities are clearly posited and strongly 
operational in such a scenario, spirit must clearly have been roused, and thus the 
aesthete so described must have moved beyond immediacy proper.  
Yet while immediacy and aestheticism cannot be said to provide a neat ontological-
existential correlation, they are nonetheless brought together in so far as the individual 
so constituted and/or at this stage, share the characteristic of dealing with the world 
according to the dictates of the senses and of viewing the world from a pre-ethico-
religious standpoint. But more importantly, if the Kierkegaardian pseudonyms fail to 
provide any consistent portrayals of immediacy in their illustrations of spiritlessness 
provided in the discussions of the stages, this might well be explained by the fact that in 
practice pure human immediacy – pure “spiritlessness” – would be exceedingly rare, and 
in his desire to address the situation of his times Kierkegaard would have been 
disinclined to spend pages detailing the existential situation of such “theoretical” cases. 
This is to suggest that in Kierkegaardian ontological terms, spirit is almost always 
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roused/posited to some extent, even if only to provide the petty level of reflection seen in 
the aesthetic stage of existence. Nonetheless, the ontology – via the more “theoretically 
inclined” pseudonymous authors responsible for developing it – is concerned with 
understanding the constitution of the immediate individual “in so far as immediacy can 
persist entirely without reflection”, a theoretical stage at which s/he is “specifiable only as 
soul.”33  
Secondly, the self-reflexive relation cannot be simply correlated with the ethical stage of 
existence, for self-reflection is a mode of being which in itself says nothing about the 
criterion taken by the individual as the organizing principle of its existence. As has 
already been seen, the highly reflective individual is not necessarily one for whom the 
categories of good and evil have meaning. Thus, both the aesthete and the ethically-
orientated individual are self-reflexive, as is (at the very least) the person existing at the 
religious stage. 
But again, this acknowledgement of the lack of paradigmatic symmetry should not blind 
us to the compelling kinship between the second relation of the ontology and the second 
stage of existence. That is to say that if the individual who has posited the self-reflexive 
polarities is not necessarily at the ethical stage of existence, it nonetheless follows that 
the ethically-orientated individual has by definition posited the self-reflexive relation (as 
well, of course, as the relation of immediacy). It also follows that the merely ethical 
individual has yet to posit the eternal relation. Judge William, for example, for all his talk 
about God, would appear to be more one who has faith in the social order of 
Christendom than one who “rests transparently in God” in the radically demanding Anti-
Climacian sense. In other words, the self-reflexive relation is the precondition (necessary 
but not sufficient) for existing at the ethical stage. Further, in so far as the self-reflexive 
polarities cannot be brought to synthesis prior to the positing of the eternal relation (as 
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has been seen), then it must be said that the ethical stage of existence is, for 
Kierkegaard, ultimately self-defeating: a conclusion that sits quite squarely with the 
notion of the moral complacency of the ethical.  
Finally, there is also no simple linear correlation between the religious stage(s) and the 
positing of the eternal relation. In other words, the individual that “consciously exists 
before God”, is not necessarily to be identified with the individual who has made the leap 
of faith itself. On the contrary, Anti-Climacus specifically considers the case of those 
defiant – and as he sees it, excruciatingly despairing – individuals (not to mention the 
devil himself) who exist consciously in relation to God while simultaneously rejecting 
God. In fact, that it is possible to exist before God and yet to be in despair, is the central 
argument of the second part of The Sickness unto Death, and what is more, Anti-
Climacus’ very definition of sin itself (see SD, 109ff).  
But once more, this asymmetry is not nearly as important as the deeper relationship 
between the third relation and stage. As was the case with the self-reflexive and the 
ethical, the positing of the eternal (or God-) relation is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for existing at the religious stage. Accordingly, those at the religious stage 
must by definition have undergone the inward synthesis whereby the hyperbolic 
elements of the self-reflexive polarities have been eternalized. In this way, the ontology 
of the eternal relation provides an important insight into the key metaphysical issues at 
play in the religious stage of existence. 
The question remains, of course, as to whether this applies also to what Johannes 
Climacus refers to as “Religiousness A.” It would appear not. What the uncompromising 
Anti-Climacus has in mind when he speaks of the relation of faith, is nothing other than 
the full intensity of “Religiousness B”, and this made quite clear in the final pages of The 
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Sickness unto Death where he speaks of the inadequacy of the Socratic definition of sin. 
But in this case, Religiousness A lacks any clear or univocal place within the structure of 
the ontology. As a “dialectic of inward deepening” (CUP, 556), the individual at this stage 
has clearly transcended a merely self-reflexive relation, but on the other hand s/he 
cannot be said to be transparently at rest in God, as having come before this “power that 
established it” in his/her endemic sinfulness. In this way, Religiousness A appears as 
something of a transitional state between the two relations, and to this extent bears 
interesting comparison with what Anti-Climacus refers to as the “borderline case” of the 
“poet existence” (see SD, 109).     
Notwithstanding the clearly asymmetrical relationship between the ontological relations 
and the existential stages – and this should come as no surprise, given Kierkegaard’s 
keynote opposition to totalizing systems that would “mummify”34 the individual out of its 
existence – these two conceptual-literary structures clearly cast considerable light and 
detailed perspective on each other. In its exploration of the essential dynamic structures 
of the relations of selfhood, the ontology sets out the subjective preconditions for the 
spirit(ual) growth of the individual. There is a subtle relationship here that spans the 
scope of the Kierkegaardian authorship, and it is one that deserves further consideration 
particularly in a period when Kierkegaard’s anti-speculative metaphysical agenda is 
often taken as an anti-essentialism per se. 
 
IV. A CONCLUDING METHODOLOGICAL NOTE 
It is true that in specifically focussing on the “psychological works”, a deliberate choice 
has been made here to highlight a theme that does not so explicitly emerge in other 
more straight-forwardly existential texts in Kierkegaard’s œuvre, where perhaps a more 
clearly “deconstructive” sense is discernible. I would suggest, however, that this diversity 
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is thoroughly in keeping with the nature and tactics of Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous 
authorship, for this is precisely the function of the strategy of creating a range of 
strategically deployed authorial voices. This does not mean the very notion of a unified 
“Kierkegaardian” perspective is untenable; for on the contrary, if we are to speak 
meaningfully about a Kierkegaardian view on human existence, it is surely necessary in 
principle, not only to consider all the pseudonymous and signed works, but also to 
consider them synoptically: to try to understand the claims of one in the light of the 
claims of others. Any reading of Kierkegaard which gives precedence to any one work or 
pseudonym in particular, will by definition yield a distorted view of the authorship as a 
whole.  
Seen in this context, the subjective ontology developed principally in the psychological 
works, while being a comparatively minor movement in a vast symphony, is of crucial 
and transformative significance to the authorship as a whole. It is to be seen in a dual 
light: as both delimiting ontology within a subjective context, as well as providing an 
ontology of the existing subject. To focus on the ontology is not to deny the crucial 
importance of Kierkegaard’s attack on the ultra-essentialism of the rationalistic 
metaphysics of his day, but it is to insist on the need to heed the claims of this often 
marginalized corner of the pseudonymous corpus and to thereby avoid a “taming” of 
Kierkegaardian thought that allows it to be too-easily subsumed into the contemporary 
post-essentialist philosophical Zeitgeist.35   
 
  28 
 
1 Certainly the most important piece in English concerning this theme is John Elrod’s Being and 
Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), 
and it is a large part of the ambitions of this essay to revive and take forward some of Elrod’s key 
insights. Also worthy of mention are parts of Preston J. Cole’s The Problematic Self in 
Kierkegaard and Freud (New Haven CT and London: Yale Univ. Press, 1971) and of course Mark 
C. Taylor’s Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and the Self (Princeton 
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975). Unfortunately, such scholarship seems to have been left in the 
1970s.   
2 See Jacques Derrida’s The Gift of Death (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995).    
3 See John D. Caputo, Against Ethics (Bloomington IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993), and “Instants, 
Secrets and Singularities: Dealing Death in Kierkegaard and Derrida” in Martin J. Matuštík and 
Merold Westphal, eds., Kierkegaard in Post/Modernity (Bloomington IN: Indiana Univ. Press, 
1995). Also, Mark C. Taylor, Tears (Albany NY: State Univ. of New York Press, 1990), and 
Altarity (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987).  
4 Caputo, “Instants, Secrets and Singularities,” p. 216. 
5 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 
1952) p. 146. This issue of the need for balance between essentiality and existentiality, which has 
recently emerged to some prominence in Heidegger scholarship, has perhaps been underplayed 
in Kierkegaard studies. Of the former, see, for example, Oliva Blanchette, “Suárez and the Latent 
Essentialism of Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology,” The Review of Metaphysics 53 (1999) 3-19, 
and A.D. Traylor, “Reassessing Heidegger on Existentia,” American Catholic Philosophical 
Quarterly 75 (2001) 523-45. 
6 See, Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. 
Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1992) pp. 118-25. Hereafter, CUP. 
7 John Elrod (pp. 9-10) made this point well: “[While] Kierkegaard’s desire to lure his reader into a 
practical rather than abstract or theoretical involvement with philosophical problems prevented 
him from writing a book with a title like The Ontological Foundation of Human Existence …at the 
same time [he recognized that this] … did not preclude the possibility, indeed the necessity, of 
developing an ontology … [Accordingly,] the concept of the self in the pseudonyms provides a 
philosophical principle of unity which enabled Kierkegaard to develop a coherent, systematic and 
unified view of human existence.”  
8 Ibid., p. 23. 
9 See Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Alastair Hannay (London: Penguin, 
1989) pp. 72-73 (hereafter, SD), where Anti-Climacus describes the devil as “pure spirit, and to 
that extent absolute consciousness and transparency.” 
10 See Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1980) 41-45 passim. Hereafter, CA. 
11 Following Mark C. Taylor, the term “self-system” will here be used for the first of these senses, 
and “self” will be used for the second. See Taylor, p. 88.     
12 Consider Haufniensis’ inconsistency on this, in CA, pp. 88 and 90.   
13 Given the purposes of the essay, this is not the place to engage in a thorough investigation into 
the considerable complexities of the formal dialectics of these synthetic relations, including the 
immanent critique of Hegelian logic they produce. Recent scholarship on this theme is, however, 
sparce. Alastair Hannay’s, “Spirit and the Idea of the Self as a Reflexive Relation” in Robert L. 
Perkins, ed, International Kierkegaard Commentary: The Sickness unto Death (Macon, GA: 
Mercer Univ. Press, 1987) pp. 23-38, is perhaps still one of the most penetrating short treatments 
of this theme. 
                                                     
  29 
                                                                                                                                                              
14 With acknowledgements to William Desmond, with whom in private conversation, this schema 
took shape.   
15 CA, 41. Thomte’s “psychically qualified” is perhaps more clearly rendered by Lowrie’s “soulishly 
determined.” See Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton NJ: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1957), p. 37. 
16 Is “achievement” the right word? This is a moot point in view of the potentially Pelagian 
interpretations of Anti-Climacus’ analysis.   
17 SD, 59. My emphasis. 
18 SD, 65-66. My insertions. 
19 See, for example, “[W]ithout possibility it is as though a person cannot draw breath … [for] 
possibility is for the self what oxygen is for breathing.” (SD, 69-70): a metaphor that bears much 
further consideration. See also, Kierkegaard’s Platonic image of the horses: “Who thinks of 
hitching Pegasus and an old nag to one carriage for a ride? And yet this is what it is to exist [as a] 
compound of finitude and infinitude.” (Howard and Edna Hong, ed and trans, Søren Kierkegaard’s 
Journals and Papers Vol I: 55 [Bloomington and London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1967]. My 
emphasis.) Similarly illuminating is his programmatic maxim, placed at the climax to The Concept 
of Anxiety: ”Whoever does not wish to sink in the wretchedness of the finite is constrained in the 
most profound sense to struggle with the infinite.” (CA, 160. Again, my emphasis.) 
20 See SD, 59. Note, however, the inexplicable break in this pattern in the otherwise 
programmatic first passages of the work, in which “freedom and necessity” are named as the two 
dialectical terms (SD, 43).  
21 This nonetheless does not prevent Haufniensis from making the extraordinary comment that 
“freedom is infinite and arises out of nothing” (CA, 112)! 
22 Louis Dupré, “The Constitution of the Self in Kierkegaard’s Philosophy,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1963) 506. 
23 Søren Kierkegaard, De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (Princeton 
NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1985), p. 171. 
24 In Kierkegaard’s Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1967), p. 185, Anti-Climacus provides an image of such an individual: the youth who 
constructs an ideal “picture” of himself to which he is drawn and with which he falls in love. 
25 In De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, p. 170, Kierkegaard notes that these meanings are neatly 
summed up in the Latin, interesse, which means both “to be between,” and “to be a matter of 
concern.” 
26 Louis Dupré, “Of Time and Eternity,” in Robert L. Perkins, ed., International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: The Concept of Anxiety (Macon GA: Mercia University Press, 1987), pp. 155ff.  
27 There are, of course, differences of interpretation concerning the meaning of “the eternal” in 
Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works. For example, John D. Glenn in his “The Definition of the 
Self and the Structure of Kierkegaard’s Work, in Robert L. Perkins, ed., International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: The Sickness unto Death, p. 9, sees the eternal-temporal distinction as one of unity 
versus dispersal; and Taylor, p. 91 sees the key issue as one of unchangeability versus 
becoming. My own approach is to see both of these as subsumed within a larger picture: that for 
the Kierkegaardian authors, in terms of the relation of the self, “the eternal” is inseparable from 
the unchanging unity of “the power that established it” (SD, 43-44).  
28 See Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, trans. Howard Hong, (Princeton NJ: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1992) p. 313. 
29 The reference, of course, is to Spinoza, but it is strongly suggested by Anti-Climacus’ 
description of the defiant individual who, “wants to begin a little earlier than most people, not at 
and with the beginning, but ‘in the beginning’” (SD, 99).   
  30 
                                                                                                                                                              
30 See, Howard and Edna Hong, trans. and ed., Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, Vol 
VI: 6446 (Bloomington and London: Indiana Univ. Press, 1978). 
31 I do not say “onto-theological” because the Kierkegaardian texts in question develop a theo-
teleological ontology of human being that is at all times a subjective ontology. The ontological 
language is here never deployed in an objective metaphysical sense, even in the case of the 
culminative category of the eternal.  
32 This is a point of some subtlety that cannot be done full justice here. Suffice to say that this 
perspective is an alternative solution to the problem of the synthesizing of eternity and temporality 
identified by Taylor in his Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship, and resolved through the 
idea of “the moment” as a bringing together of the temporal and the eternal (p. 116-122). The 
problem with Taylor’s solution, I would argue, is that in focussing on the existentiality of decision 
to the neglect of the ontology, he has Kierkegaard raising the temporal-eternal mediation above 
the eternal per se. But this is equivalent to insisting upon the continuation of the pattern of 
ontological horizontality (that is a property of the preceding temporal relations) within the eternal 
relation as well, rather than noting the post-dialectical verticality which takes over here.      
33 SD, 81. My emphasis.  
34 With a bow to Nietzsche. See: “Twilight of the Idols”, in trans. Walter Kaufmann, The Portable 
Nietzsche (New York: Viking, 1954) p. 35. 
35 I would like to thank William Desmond, Gordon Marino and an anonymous reader from 
International Philosophical Quarterly, for helpful comments on earlier versions of this essay.  
